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Abstract. We study the computational problem of identifying optimal
sets of kidney exchanges in the UK. We show how to expand an integer
programming-based formulation [1, 19] in order to model the criteria that
constitute the UK definition of optimality. The software arising from this
work has been used by the National Health Service Blood and Transplant
to find optimal sets of kidney exchanges for their National Living Donor
Kidney Sharing Schemes since July 2008. We report on the characteristics
of the solutions that have been obtained in matching runs of the scheme
since this time. We then present empirical results arising from the real
datasets that stem from these matching runs, with the aim of establishing
the extent to which the particular optimality criteria that are present
in the UK influence the structure of the solutions that are ultimately
computed. A key observation is that allowing 4-way exchanges would be
likely to lead to a significant number of additional transplants.
1 Introduction
It is understood that transplantation is the most effective treatment that is
currently known for kidney failure. In the UK alone, as of 31 March 2011 there
were 6871 patients waiting on the transplant list for a donor kidney, with the
median waiting time being 1153 days for an adult and 307 days for a child.
Kidneys used for transplantation can come from both deceased and living donors.
In the UK, around 38% of all kidney transplants are from living donors [14].
It is often the case that a patient requiring a kidney transplant has a willing
donor, but due to blood- and/or tissue-type incompatibilities, the transplant
cannot take place. However, in the UK, the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (HTA) introduced, among other things, the
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2legal framework required to allow the transplantation of organs between donors
and patients with no genetic or emotional connection.
With the introduction of the HTA, a patient with an incompatible donor can
now “swap” their donor with that of another patient in a similar position, via
“kidney exchanges” that involve two or more incompatible patient–donor pairs.
For example, a pairwise (kidney) exchange involves two incompatible patient–
donor pairs (p1, d1) and (p2, d2), where d1 is compatible with p2, and d2 is com-
patible with p1: d1 donates a kidney to p2 in exchange for d2 donating a kidney
to p1. 3-way exchanges extend this concept to three pairs in a cyclic manner.
In a number of countries, centralised programmes (also known as kidney
exchange matching schemes) have been introduced to help optimise the search
for kidney exchanges. These include the USA [13, 2, 15], the Netherlands [9, 10]
and South Korea [17, 16].
Following the introduction of the HTA, in early 2007 the UK established what
has now become the National Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes (NLDKSS),
administered by the National Health Service Blood and Transplant (NHSBT)
(formerly UK Transplant) [8]. The purpose of the NLDKSS is two-fold: firstly to
identify those pairs that are compatible with one another and then subsequently
to optimise the selected set of kidney exchanges subject to certain criteria. It
is the responsibility of NHSBT (and in particular its Kidney Advisory Group)
to supply the scoring system that is used to measure the benefit of potential
transplants, and the optimality criteria for the selection of kidney exchanges.
In general, it is seen as logistically challenging to carry out the transplants
involved in a kidney exchange when the number of pairs involved increases. This
is because all operations have to be performed simultaneously due to the risk of
a donor reneging on his/her commitment to donate a kidney after their loved one
has received a kidney. Mainly for this reason, at the present time the NLDKSS
does not allow exchanges involving more than three pairs.
A kidney exchange matching scheme may also include altruistic donors, who
do not have an associated patient and who are willing to donate a kidney to a
stranger. An altruistic donor d0 can either donate directly to a patient (without
a donor) on the Deceased Donor Waiting List (DDWL), or else trigger a domino
paired chain (DPC) [3] involving one or more incompatible patient–donor pairs:
here d0 donates to a patient p1 in exchange for p1’s donor donating to the patient
p2 in the next pair in the chain, with the final donor donating to the DDWL. A
DPC is short (resp. long) if it consists of one (resp. two) incompatible patient–
donor pairs). At present the NLDKSS allows short but not long chains.
Kidney exchange has received considerable attention in the computer science,
economics and medical literature in recent years [1, 3–7, 18–21]. It has been ob-
served that when only pairwise exchanges are permitted, an optimal solution can
usually (depending of course on the definition of optimality) be found in poly-
nomial time using maximum weight matching in a general graph (see e.g., [5]
for more details). However when pairwise and 3-way exchanges are allowed, the
problem of finding a set of exchanges that maximises the number of transplants
is NP-hard [1] and indeed APX-hard [5].
3Abraham et al. [1], and independently Roth et al. [19], described two integer
programming (IP)-based formulations of the problem of finding a maximum
weight set of kidney exchanges, when both pairwise and 3-way exchanges are
permitted (here, the weights can measure the benefit of potential transplants).
Abraham et al. [1] showed that, due to scaling issues with the first of these
models (the so-called edge formulation), the second model (the so-called cycle
formulation) is the preferred way to model the problem using an IP.
In this paper we present an application-driven case study, showing how the
cycle formulation can be extended in order to handle kidney exchange in the UK.
In particular, we show how to model a complex set of criteria (given in Section 2)
that form the definition of an optimal set of kidney exchanges. Although most
of the criteria have not been explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the literature,
they are natural rather than idiosyncratic. We have implemented the technique
and it has been used by NHSBT to find optimal sets of kidney exchanges for the
NLDKSS since July 2008. Our contribution in this paper is as follows:
1. We describe the IP constraints that are required in order to enforce the
NLDKSS optimality definition (Section 3). The description could help to
inform decision makers in other countries who are in the early stages of
setting up a kidney exchange matching scheme.
2. We report on our practical experience over a 3-year period of using the
technique to find optimal solutions for matching runs of the NLDKSS, which
are carried out approximately every quarter (Section 4).
3. We present empirical results arising from a web application that is capable of
automating the experimental comparison of solutions according to a range of
different optimality criteria (Section 5). Again, these results arise from real
datasets and indicate the extent to which the particular optimality criteria
that are present in the UK influence the structure of the solutions that are
ultimately computed. A key observation is that allowing 4-way exchanges
would be likely to lead to a significant number of additional transplants.
2 The NLDKSS optimality criteria
The problem of finding an optimal set of kidney exchanges essentially corre-
sponds to computing optimal cycle packings in weighted directed graphs. Sup-
pose we have n incompatible patient–donor pairs {(pi, di) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and k
altruistic donors {dn+i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. We associate with each altruistic donor dn+i
a dummy patient pn+i who is compatible with every donor dj where 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
We model the kidney exchange problem by forming a weighted directed graph
D = (V,A), where V = {v1, . . . , vn+k} and vi corresponds to (pi, di) (1 ≤ i ≤
n+k). Moreover (vi, vj) ∈ A if and only if di is compatible with pj . In this way, 2-
cycles and 3-cycles in D not involving an altruistic donor correspond to pairwise
and 3-way exchanges respectively, whilst 2-cycles and 3-cycles in D involving an
altruistic donor dn+i correspond to short and long chains respectively, where in
practice the final donor in the chain donates a kidney to the DDWL. (Note that
our model handles both short and long chains.)
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Fig. 1. Example of a 3-cycle containing a back-arc and an embedded 2-cycle.
An arc (vi, vj) has a real-valued weight w(vi, vj) > 0 that arises from a scor-
ing system employed by NHSBT to measure the potential benefit of a transplant
from di to pj . Factors involved in computing this weight include waiting time for
pj (based on the number of previous matching runs that pj has been unsuccess-
fully involved in), pj ’s sensitisation (based on calculated HLA antibody reaction
frequency), HLA mismatch levels between di and pj (which roughly speaking
corresponds to levels of tissue-type incompatibility) and points relating to the
difference in ages between di and dj (see [8] for more details). The weight of a
cycle c in D is the sum of the weights of the individual arcs in c.
A set of exchanges in D is a permutation pi of V such that (i) for each
vi ∈ V , if pi(vi) 6= vi then (vi, pi(vi)) ∈ A, and (ii) no cycle in pi has length > 3.
If pi(vi) 6= vi then vi is said to be matched, otherwise vi is unmatched. Suppose
some vi ∈ V is unmatched. If 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then neither di nor pi will participate in
a kidney exchange. However if i > n, di will donate directly to the DDWL. For
this reason, we define the size of pi (corresponding to the number of transplants
yielded by this set of exchanges) to be the number of vertices matched by pi plus
the number of unmatched vertices corresponding to altruistic donors.
Given a 3-cycle c in D with arcs (vi, vj), (vj , vk), (vk, vi), we say that c con-
tains a back-arc if without loss of generality (vj , vi) ∈ A. In such a case we
say that c contains an embedded 2-cycle involving arcs (vi, vj), (vj , vi). A 3-cycle
with a back-arc and an embedded 2-cycle is illustrated in Figure 1. An effective
2-cycle is either a 2-cycle or a 3-cycle with a back-arc.
A back-arc can be seen as a form of fault-tolerance in a 3-cycle. To understand
why, consider the 3-cycle in Figure 1. If either p3 or d3 drops out (for example
due to illness), then the pairwise exchange involving (p1, d1) and (p2, d2) might
still be able to proceed. On the other hand, if either of the pairs (p1, d1) or
(p2, d2) were to withdraw, then this pairwise exchange would have failed anyway.
Thus the risk involved with a 3-way exchange, due to the greater likelihood (as
compared to a pairwise exchange) of the cycle breaking down before transplants
can be scheduled, is mitigated with the inclusion of a back-arc.
We now present the definition of an optimal set of exchanges for the NLDKSS,
as determined by the Kidney Advisory Group of NHSBT.
Definition 1. A set of exchanges pi is optimal if:
1. the number of effective 2-cycles in pi is maximised;
2. subject to (1), pi has maximum size;
3. subject to (1)-(2), the number of 3-cycles in pi is minimised;
4. subject to (1)-(3), the number of back-arcs in the 3-cycles in pi is maximised;
5. subject to (1)-(4), the overall weight of the cycles in pi is maximised.
5We give some intuition for Definition 1 as follows. The first priority is to
ensure that there are at least as many 2-cycles and embedded 2-cycles as there
would be in an optimal solution containing only 2-cycles. This is to ensure that
the introduction of 3-way exchanges is not detrimental to the maximum number
of pairwise exchanges that could possibly take place. Subject to this we max-
imise the total number of transplants (this is the number of unmatched altruistic
donors, plus twice the number of pairwise exchanges and short chains, plus 3
times the number of 3-way exchanges and long chains). Subject to this we min-
imise the number of 3-way exchanges. Despite Criterion 1, this is still required:
for example an optimal solution could either comprise three 3-way exchanges,
each with a back-arc, or three pairwise exchanges and one 3-way exchange (both
solutions have size 9 and contain three effective 2-cycles) – see Appendix A in
[11] for an illustration. Clearly there is less risk of cycles breaking down with the
second solution. Next the number of back-arcs in 3-way exchanges is maximised
(note that a 3-way exchange could contain more than one back-arc). Finally we
maximise the sum of the cycle weights.
3 Finding an optimal solution
In this section we describe an algorithm that uses a sequence of IP formulations
to find an optimal set of kidney exchanges with respect to Definition 1. After
each run of the IP solver, we use the optimal value calculated at that iteration to
enforce a constraint that must be satisfied in subsequent iterations. This ensures
that once Criteria 1..r in Definition 1 have been satisfied by an intermediate
solution, they continue to hold when we additionally enforce Criterion r + 1
(1 ≤ r ≤ 4). At the outset, an IP formulation, called the basic IP model, is cre-
ated. This extends the cycle formulation of [1, 19] in order to enable unmatched
altruistic donors to be quantified. Recall that n is the number of incompatible
patient–donor pairs and k is the number of altruistic donors. The basic IP model
is then constructed as follows:
1. list all the possible cycles of length 2 and 3 in the directed graph D as
C1, C2, . . . , Cm, where, without loss of generality, the 2-cycles are C1, . . . . ,
Cn2 , the 3-cycles are Cn2+1, . . . , Cn2+n3 , and the 3-cycles with back-arcs are
Cn2+1, . . . , Cn2+nb3 (so m = n2 + n3);
2. let x be an (m + k) × 1 vector of binary variables x1, x2, . . . , xm+k, where
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, xi = 1 if and only if Ci belongs to an optimal solution, and
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, xm+i = 1 if and only if altruistic donor dn+i is unmatched;
3. let A be an (n + 2k) × (m + k) {−1, 0, 1}-valued matrix, whose entries are
all 0 apart from the following:
(a) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Ai,j = 1 if and only if Cj contains di;
(b) for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), in rows n+ 2i− 1 and n+ 2i:
i. for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, An+2i−1,j = 1 if and only if cycle Cj contains dn+i,
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, An+2i−1,m+j = 1 if and only if i = j;
ii. for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, An+2i,j = −1 if and only if cycle Cj contains dn+i,
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, An+2i,m+j = −1 if and only if i = j;
64. let b be an (n+ 2k)× 1 vector where:
(a) for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), bi = 1;
(b) for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) bn+2i−1 = 1 and bn+2i = −1;
5. let c be a 1 × (m + k) vector of values corresponding to the coefficients of
current objective criterion, e.g., cj could be the length of Cj ;
6. solve max cx such that Ax ≤ b.
We now provide some intuition for the model above. Part 3(a) (in combina-
tion with 4(a)) ensures that each patient–donor pair is involved in at most one
cycle in any solution. Similarly 3(b)(i) (with 4(b)) ensures that each altruistic
donor is involved in at most one cycle. 3(b)(i) (with 4(b)) also ensures that if a
cycle involving an altruistic donor dn+i is chosen then vn+i must be matched.
Similarly, 3(b)(ii) (with 4(b)) ensures that if no cycle involving an altruistic
donor dn+i is chosen then vn+i must be unmatched.
We now describe the sequence of steps that is used in order to compute an
optimal set of exchanges in D according to Definition 1. Item r in the following
list corresponds to the step in the algorithm that enforces Criterion r (together
with Criteria 1..r− 1) in the optimality definition. At each iteration we indicate
the additional constraints that are added to the basic IP model and also the
objective function used at each iteration (where appropriate).
1. The number of effective 2-cycles is maximised.
Construct an undirected graph G = (V,E) corresponding to the underlying
digraph D, where the vertices in G and D are identical, and an edge in G
corresponds to a 2-cycle in D (i.e., {vi, vj} ∈ E if and only if (vi, vj) ∈ A
and (vj , vi) ∈ A). Compute N2, the size of a maximum cardinality matching
in G using Edmonds’ algorithm [12]. Then add the following constraint:
x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn2+nb3 ≥ N2. (1)
2. Subject to (1), the size is maximised.
Consider the basic IP model, together with (1), and with the objective
max cx, where ci = 2 (1 ≤ i ≤ n2), ci = 3 (n2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3) and
ci = 1 (n2 + n3 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3 + k). That is, for r ∈ {2, 3}, each variable
representing an r-cycle has coefficient r, and each variable representing an
altruistic donor has coefficient 1, where the objective is to maximise. After
calculating the optimal value N , add the following constraint:
2x1+. . .+2xn2+3xn2+1+. . .+3xn2+n3+xn2+n3+1+. . .+xn2+n3+k ≥ N. (2)
3. Subject to (1)-(2), the number of 3-cycles is minimised.
Consider the basic IP model, together with (1)-(2), and with the objective
min cx, where ci = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n2), ci = 1 (n2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3) and ci = 0
(n2+n3+1 ≤ i ≤ n2+n3+ k). That is, each variable representing a 3-cycle
has coefficient 1, whilst all others have coefficient 0. After calculating the
optimal value N3, add the following constraint:
xn2+1 + . . .+ xn2+n3 ≤ N3. (3)
74. Subject to (1)-(3), the number of back-arcs in the 3-cycles is maximised.
Let ki be the number of back-arcs in cycle Ci (n2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3).
Consider the basic IP, together with (1)-(3), and with the objective max cx,
where ci = 0 (1 ≤ i ≤ n2), ci = ki (n2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3) and ci = 0
(n2 + n3 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3 + k). That is, each variable corresponding to
a 2-cycle or to an altruistic donor has coefficient 0, and each variable xi
representing a 3-cycle has coefficient ki. Suppose that an optimal solution
has value NB. Add the following constraint:
kn2+1xn2+1 + . . .+ kn2+nb3xn2+nb3 ≥ NB. (4)
5. Subject to (1)-(4), the overall weight is maximised.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3), let wi be the weight of cycle Ci. Consider the
basic IP model, together with (1)-(4), and with the objective max cx, where
ci = wi (1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3) and ci = 0 (n2 + n3 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 + n3 + k). That
is, each variable corresponding to a cycle has coefficient equal to the weight
of that cycle, whilst each variable corresponding to an altruistic donor has
coefficient 0. A solution to this final IP is an optimal set of exchanges relative
to Definition 1.
We remark that an alternative to solving a series of IP formulations would be to
solve a single IP relative to a weight function that captures the various criteria
in the optimality definition (together with their priority levels) by assigning
weights of successively decreasing orders of magnitude starting from Criterion
1 downwards. This is however impractical: due to the size of the datasets in
practice, it would be computationally infeasible to work with such weights.
Another approach would be to assign smaller weights that somehow prioritise
cycles with “good” characteristics, such as 3-cycles with back-arcs. However it
is not clear how such weights should be defined, especially as theoretically there
is no upper bound on the score of an arc as provided by NHSBT. Any attempt
along these lines could never result in a concrete definition of exactly what is
being optimised in an optimal solution, as we have obtained here.
4 NLDKSS in Practice
Prior to our involvement, NHSBT used an in-house algorithm that identified only
pairwise exchanges. With the need to find both pairwise and 3-way exchanges,
a new software application was developed based on the algorithm outlined in
Section 3. At its heart the application uses the COIN-Cbc IP solver to solve
each of the IP problems involved. COIN-Cbc was chosen due to its open licence
agreement and the need to deploy the application commercially. Speed improve-
ments using IBM ILOG CPLEX and Gurobi Optimizer were minimal with the
current size of the datasets.
The application can be extended via a plugin architecture that allows con-
straints to be created, added or removed in a straightforward manner. This
added flexibility allows our software to be easily adapted for use in other kidney
8Matching run 2008 2009 2010 2011
Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jun Oct Jan Apr Jun Oct
#vertices 85 123 126 128 141 147 150 158 141 178 186 163 176 180
Properties #arcs 236 734 617 771 1248 901 832 876 533 939 1263 750 992 919
of D #2-cycles 2 14 17 20 55 4 17 23 4 20 19 9 34 18
#3-cycles 0 116 72 71 166 4 33 77 1 39 145 27 101 73
Identified #2-cycles 1 6 5 5 4 0 3 2 3 3 3 0 5 7
solution #3-cycles 0 3 1 2 7 2 1 6 0 2 10 4 4 5
size 2 21 13 16 29 6 9 22 6 12 36 12 22 29
Actual #pairwise 1 4 5 2 3 0 2 4 0 3 2 0 2 6
transplants #3-way 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 3 0 1 5 2 4 3
total 2 8 10 4 12 6 4 17 0 9 19 6 16 21
Table 1. Results arising from matching runs from July 2008 to October 2011.
exchange matching schemes, whether that involves simply changing the order of
constraints or adding completely new ones.
The application can either be accessed programatically through a web API
or alternatively manually via a web interface1. The former version (along with
several prototypes) has been used by NHSBT to find an optimal solution in each
of the matching runs (occurring at roughly quarterly intervals), since July 2008.
Table 1 summarises the input to, and output from, each matching run be-
tween July 2008 and October 2011. In each case an optimal solution2 was re-
turned within a second (on a Linux Centos 5.5 machine with a Pentium 4 3GHz
single core processor with 2Gb RAM) despite a gradually increasing pool of
donors. In total 235 potential transplants were identified (47 pairwise and 47 3-
way exchanges), which have resulted in 134 actual transplants3 (34 pairwise and
22 3-way exchanges). Together with the 4 pairwise exchanges that were identified
as part of the NLDKSS prior to our involvement, there have been a total of 142
actual transplants to date. Note that altruistic donors were not introduced into
the NLDKSS until January 2012, and hence in Table 1, the number of vertices
corresponds to the number of patient–donor pairs in each matching run.
The table shows that the matching run in January 2011 had the largest
number of vertices and arcs in the underlying digraph, and the largest number
of potential transplants of any matching run were identified (36). Even so, the
digraph underlying the July 2009 dataset had a larger number of 2-cycles and
3-cycles. It is expected that the digraphs will become much denser once altruistic
donors are introduced, and larger as awareness of the scheme grows over time.
1 http://kidney.optimalmatching.com
2 Note that the optimality criteria were slightly different from July 2008 to July 2009.
See Appendix B in [11] for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
3 In general not all transplants identified by the software will lead to operations in
practice: one reason is that more detailed cross-matching between each donor and
patient identified for transplant takes place after the matching run, which may lead
to new incompatibilities being identified; also a donor or patient may become ill
between the date of the matching run and the date of the operation.
95 Data analysis software and empirical results
Due to the complex nature of the optimality criteria used by the NLDKSS, it
became obvious that there was a need to analyse the effect of each constraint.
Furthermore, as the NLDKSS evolves it is likely that the maximum length of a
DPC and/or the maximum length of cycle allowed in a solution will increase.
In turn, these developments might lead to additional constraints being required.
The effect of such changes is often difficult to quantify, as carrying out experi-
mental comparisons can be time-consuming due to the significant development
work required, and the execution of simulations.
To this end a web application4 (referred to as the toolkit) was developed
that allows NHSBT staff to examine the impact of adding/removing constraints,
allowing longer altruistic chains, and increasing the maximum cycle length. The
output from the application can determine information such as the size and
weight of an optimal set of exchanges, the number of each type of exchange
(i.e. pairwise, 3-way, etc.), and the number of DPCs. This information can be
downloaded in the form of a spreadsheet.
In this section we report on an empirical analysis, using the toolkit, of the
14 matching runs that have taken place between July 2008 and October 2011.
The aim is to determine the effect (in terms of the overall size or weight) of (i)
prioritising pairwise exchanges, (ii) minimising the number of 3-way exchanges
and maximising the number of back-arcs, and (iii) allowing 4-way exchanges in
the optimality definition. Again, a Linux Centos 5.5 machine with a Pentium 4
3GHz single core processor with 2Gb RAM was used, and every optimal solution
was computed in under two seconds.
First we examine the effect on the size of an optimal set of exchanges pi in
three cases concerning whether to prioritise 2-cycles or effective 2-cycles:
(A) when Definition 1 is unchanged;
(B) when Criterion 1 is omitted from Definition 1;
(C) when Criterion 1 is replaced by “maximise the number of 2-cycles”.
Figure 2 shows the size of an optimal solution in each case, over the 14 matching
runs. It reveals that on average if we relax the need to first maximise the number
of 2-cycles or effective 2-cycles (case B from the above list) we would obtain only
a single extra transplant per matching run. In contrast, if we require the number
of pairwise exchanges alone to be maximised as first priority, then we would see
a reduction in the number of transplants by, on average, 3 per matching run.
In many cases obtaining a single extra transplant could make it worth changing
the criteria, however in this case, given the desirable properties of embedded
2-cycles, the extra risk involved for the single extra transplant is unlikely to be
justified.
We now analyse the effect on an optimal solution when we first apply Criteria
1 and 2 from Definition 1, then decide whether or not to apply Criteria 3 and
4 (i.e., minimise the number of 3-cycles and maximise the number of back-arcs
4 http://toolkit.optimalmatching.com
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respectively), and subsequently maximise the total weight. This gives four cases
that correspond to the combinations of including / excluding Criteria 3 and 4.
It turns out that in each of these four cases, the solution output in each of the
14 matching runs is exactly the same, i.e., posting constraints to minimise the
number of 3-ways exchanges or maximise the number of back-arcs has no effect.
It appears that enforcing Criterion 1 (maximise the number of effective 2-cycles)
results in a very small set of candidates for a solution that is optimal overall. If
we no longer insist that Criterion 1 is enforced, then variations on the weight of
an optimal solution are observed in the four cases. The additional time required
to find a solution that satisfies Criteria 3 and 4 (as opposed to satisfying only
Criteria 1, 2 and 5) is minimal (a solution is found in both cases in under two
seconds for each dataset). Hence Criteria 3 and 4 should be retained as they
may well have an impact for larger / denser datasets that are likely to feature
in matching runs in the short / medium term.
We next determine the effect of increasing the maximum cycle size. Initially
the NLDKSS allowed only pairwise exchanges in an optimal solution, but 3-way
exchanges were permitted from April 2008 (subject to the condition that the
number of effective 2-cycles is first maximised). Clearly extending the solution
to allow for 4-way exchanges ought to increase further the number of transplants,
but this must be set against the greater risk of such exchanges not proceeding.
In Figure 3 we show the total number of transplants at each of the 14 match-
ing runs if an optimal set of exchanges pi is defined as follows:
(A) maximise the size of pi, allowing only 2-cycles;
(B) first maximise the number of effective 2-cycles, then subject to that maximise
the total number of transplants, allowing only 2-cycles and 3-cycles;
(C) first maximise the number of effective 2-cycles, then subject to this maximise
the number of effective 3-cycles (defined to be the number of 3-cycles plus the
number of 4-cycles with embedded 3-cycles), then subject to this maximise
the size of pi, allowing 2-cycles, 3-cycles and 4-cycles.
As expected, allowing 4-way exchanges leads to an increased number of trans-
plants: on average, an additional 4 transplants per matching run (compared to
allowing only pairwise and 3-way exchanges). This number is smaller than the
increase observed when allowing both pairwise and 3-way exchanges (compared
to allowing only pairwise exchanges) where on average there are 7 additional
transplants per matching run.
Finally we observe the effects of including altruistic donors in the dataset.
Altruistic donors are set to be included in the NLDKSS from January 2012. In
order to understand their impact in terms of increased numbers of transplants,
the data from the January 2009 matching run was augmented by NHSBT staff
with six altruistic donors known at that time. Of particular interest was to
determine the benefits of including only short chains or both short and long
chains (subject to the optimality criteria in Definition 1).
The test results indicated that, in the absence of altruistic donors, 15 trans-
plants were obtained. When only short chains are permitted, 27 transplants were
identified. Finally, if we allow both short and long chains, 31 transplants were
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Fig. 2. Effect of prioritising pairwise ex-
changes
Fig. 3. Effect of increasing the maximum
cycle size
identified. This shows that the difference between including only short chains, as
opposed to both short and long chains, is of lesser importance than the benefit
obtained by allowing short chains, as compared to not includng altruistic donors.
However, given that any long chain must have at least one embedded 2-cycle,
the risk of including long chains should be seen as minimal.
6 Future work
Our case study has been driven by a particular practical application, and as
such the empirical evaluation in Section 5 was based on real datasets (spanning
a period of 42 months). However further experiments are required on artificially
generated data which will facilitate both a larger number of trials and bigger
datasets. This will provide important information on how far the software, in its
current form, is likely to scale. Furthermore, using these datasets may provide
greater insight into the effect a particular constraint has on the system.
Future work must also ensure that the algorithms described in this paper can
scale as participation in the NLDKSS increases. It is anticipated that column
generation techniques, along the lines of those described by Abraham et al. [1],
will be required to ensure that we can meet the needs of the NLDKSS in the
future, given the likelihood of larger datasets and the potential introduction of
long chains and 4-way exchanges.
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